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LAMPADEPHORIAt
WITHHOLDING OF APPRAISMENT UNDER THE
UNITED STATES ANTI-DUMPING ACT:
PROTECTIONISM OR UNFAIR-COMPETITION LAW?
ROY L. PROSTERMAN*
The Anti-dumping Act of 1921 is, in the view of Professor Proster-
nzan, in very real danger of being diverted from an antitrust law into
a protectionist or tariff-like measure as a result of an unfortunate comn-
bination of administrative techniques built into the act and current
practical pressures. The author discusses the cause of this diversion
and offers some suggestions for reform which will prevent the anti-
dumping law from growing into a protectionist device which is inimical
to the current trends toward free trade.
The United States anti-dumping law' is, in the broad sense, an
antitrust law or anti-unfair competition law. It is analogous in many
ways to our Robinson-Patman Act,' which prohibits a manufacturer
from discriminating unjustifiably among his domestic U.S. customers,
except that the anti-dumping law is supposed to prevent foreign manu-
facturers from discriminating unjustifiably between their home-market
customers and their U.S. customers. One must hasten to add that
this protection is not aimed at a higher U.S. price because we are not
concerned with any real possibility of competition between U.S. cus-
tomers and the manufacturer's foreign customers buying at some
putatively lower price-under Robinson-Patman we are, of course,
concerned with such so-called "secondary line" effects of domestic
discriminations between customers operating, so to speak, cheek by
jowl-but rather under anti-dumping we are concerned with a price
to U.S. customers which is lower than the price to home-market
t Lampadephoria is a new section in the Washington Law Review. For an explana-
tion of its meaning see the Editor's Notes.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington. A.B., Chicago, 1954;
LL.B., Harvard, 1958.
'Anti-dumping Act of 1921, §§ 201-12, 42 Stat. 11, as amended, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-71
(1964). The author wishes to thank Seymour Graubard and Michael H. Greenberg
of the New York bar and Alfred P. McCauley of the District of Columbia bar for
making available their excellent analysis in the unpublished American Institute
for Imported Steel, Inc.-Report, "United States Antidumping Policy-At Present
and As Proposed by the Herlong-Hartke Bill," Dec. 15, 1965 (hereinafter cited as
Report). A copy of the Report has been placed on file in the library of the School
of Law, University of Washington.
'Sections 2-4, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964).
[315 ]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
customers which may have an adverse competitive impact at what we
call the "primary line" under Robinson-Patman, that is, an impact
against domestic U.S. producers who are in a real sense in direct
competition with the foreign exporting manufacturer.' When the anti-
dumping act was passed in 1921 it was conceived roughly in terms
of protecting supposedly infant U.S. industries against competition
from ominous and powerful European "cartels" which would finance
low-priced sales on the U.S. market out of monopoly profits made at
home and thus stifle the growth of the U.S. industry and of an effective
U.S. competition.4 Like our Robinson-Patman Act policy, the earliest
version of which was articulated in the Clayton Act5 seven years
before the anti-dumping act was passed, our anti-dumping provisions
probably represent the most thorough-going framework for action
against alleged discrimination in price thus far developed in any of
the industrialized nations.
But how is this framework being used? Do changed facts or the
experiences of actual administration suggest that it should be revised,
and indeed, is it possible to address even more fundamental questions
to the need for its existence at all?
I should like to deal principally with the question whether the
anti-dumping law, which as I have said is an antitrust law and not
at all a protectionist measure or tariff in the more customary sense,
is being or is threatened to be diverted from its purposes and trans-
formed into a protectionist measure by an unfortunate combination
of administrative techniques built into the act and current practical
pressures. If this diversion is occurring, is it possible to visualize
the form that redress-which would be principally statutory, although
' For the development of the "primary line" and "secondary line" concepts under
the Robinson-Patman Act, see FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1963) ;
RowE, PRICE Dlscmnix'IoN UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 141-204 (1962) ; id.
(Supp. 1964). Rowe refers to the anti-dumping provisions as "parallel legislation."
Id. at 82-83, n.153. The Robinson-Patman Act is, of course, available against a
foreign exporting manufacturer's discrimination among his U.S. customers, al-
though there are practical difficulties in obtaining jurisdiction and enforcement
has been minimal. Id. at 81-83.
'See Ehrenhaft, Protection Against International Price Discrimination: United
States Countervailing and Antidumping Duties, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 44, 45, 53, &
text at nn.56, 57 (1958); Report, supra note 1, at 1-3. See generally H.R. RP.
No. 1, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921).
The Anti-dumping Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 798, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1964), made it a
criminal offense to import "at a price substantially less than the actual market
value" if the importation was done "with the intent" of destroying or injuring a
U.S. industry, but this provision has been virtually a dead letter (research has uncov-
ered no reported decision involving a claim under this act over the past thirty
years) largely because of the problems of proving the requisite intent and the com-
parative attractiveness of proceeding under the 1921 act.
'Section 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
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I shall make one suggestion which could be most directly met by a
change in the regulations-might take? The practical pressure for
diversion of the act from its purpose comes from domestic industries
feeling the competitive bite from exports coming in under the steadily
lower prevailing tariff rates of past years.' Pressure from the domestic
steel industry and other industries has led to the introduction of a
number of bills in Congress over the past few years to render much
stricter the provisions of the anti-dumping law7 and attention now
focuses on what has become known as the Herlong-Hartke bill,8 but
the present act unfortunately already contains provisions which can
permit it to have a highly protectionist effect in the sense that a
domestic industry complaint can stand a very good chance of freezing
out exports from abroad even when there is absolutely no substantive
validity to the charge that dumping is occurring and hence no actual
occasion for the application of the anti-unfair competition policy
embodied in the act.
This can occur because of the circumstances under which a with-
holding of appraisement of incoming goods by U.S. customs can take
place under the administration of the act. Under the statutory scheme,
there is basically a three-step procedure under which the Secretary of
the Treasury first makes a determination that he has reason to believe
or suspect that export sales to U.S. purchasers are taking place at
"lower than foreign market value"; 9 secondly, the Secretary makes
a determination that the sales to the U.S. are occurring at less than
fair value;1" and finally, upon affirmative determination to that effect,
the Tariff Commission takes jurisdiction for purposes of determining
-which it must do within three months after the Treasury's second
determination-whether the U.S. industry is being injured or is likely
to be injured (or is being prevented from becoming established) by
these less-than-fair-value sales by foreign exporters.-' Only upon all
of these determinations being made can a finding of dumping issue.
"See note 17, infra; Baler, Substantive Interpretations Under the Antiduoping
Act and the Foreign Trade Policy of the United States, 17 STAN. L. REv. 409, 411(1965).
Id. at 411-12, 457-62; see also Note, The Antiduinping Act: Problems of Admit-
istration and Proposals for Change, 17 STAN. L. REv. 730 (1965) (on the whole
favoring a stricter approach) ; Report, supra note 1, at 20-42.
'Senator Hartke's bill was S. 2045, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). Representative
Herlong's bill was H.R. 8510, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
'Anti-Dumping Act of 1921, § 201(b), 42 Stat. 11, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 160(b)
(1964).
" Anti-Dumping Act of 1921, § 201 (a), 42 Stat. 11, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 160(a)(1964); § 1(3), 72 Stat. 583 (1958), 19 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
n Ibid.
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A special duty will then be levied against the incoming goods which
are the subject of the finding; this duty is equal to the difference
between the purchase price in the U.S. and the foreign market value.1 2
The latter term refers generally to the price at which the goods are
sold in the home market, and the act provides for adjustments of
the actual U.S. purchase price to reflect costs of transportation,
handling, import duties and other costs attributable to the importation
of goods as well as its adjustment to reflect differences in quantities
or other circumstances of sale-which may include such things as
credit terms, special services rendered, advertising allowances, etc.-
in order to back-calculate from the actual U.S. purchase price a figure
which can be compared with the price at which the goods have been
sold in the home market. In a sense, one can say that this is basically
an arithmetical calculation in which both the actual home market
sales price and the actual U.S. market price are traced back to an
f.o.b. factory price for both lots of goods. 3 The statute gives no help
in determining what factors go into the further determinations to be
made with respect to less than fair value and with respect to industry
injury, but one very significant point as it has turned out is that it
is at the first stage-the stage at which the Secretary has reason to
believe that sales are being made in the U.S. at less than foreign
market value-that the Secretary "shall authorize"'14 withholding of
appraisement. This means purely and simply that the importer has
no way of knowing, from the time of this first determination (and
indeed covering a period which may range up to several months
preceding this determination15 ), up to the time of the final determina-
nAnti-dumping Act of 1921, § 202(a), 42 Stat. 11 as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 161(a)
(1964).
3 See Anti-dumping Act of 1921, §§ 202(b),(c), 205, 42 Stat. 11, 13, as amended,
19 U.S.C. §§ 161(b), (c), 164 (1964). In the Report of the Secretary of the Treasury
to the Congress on the Operation and Effectiveness of Antidumping Act, published
in Hearings on H.R. 6006 & 5120 Before the House Committee on Ways and
Means, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 10-29 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Treasury Report],
it is noted that "In its simplest form the calculation can ordinarily be made by
taking the f.o.b. factory price, in each case for the sale to the United States market
and for the home consumption sale." Id. at 12-13. Again, "These prices must be
adjusted so that they are properly comparable-which typically means a comparison
f.o.b. factory." Id. at 16.
'
4 Anti-dumping Act of 1921, § 201(b), 42 Stat 11, as amended, 19 U.S.C. 8
160(b) (1964).
The dutiable period can extend prior to the notice of withholding of appraise-
ment to cover merchandise "entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption,
not more than one hundred twenty days before the question of dumping was raised
by or presented to the Secretary" or his delegate, pursuant to the Anti-dumping Act
of 1921, § 202(a), 42 Stat 11, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 161(a) (1964). The regulations
have not taken advantage of the full power granted, but set the more normal dutiable
period as one commencing with the publication of the notice of withholding of
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tion by the Tariff Commission, what the duty is going to be on the
goods imported if there should be an adverse finding. The importer
thus must either continue to import the goods, reselling them to his own
customers or incorporating them in his own products and standing
ready to absorb a large additional liability for duty if the finding
goes against him in the Tariff Commission, or else he must discontinue
importation of the goods until the situation has been clarified by a
final decision, which in practical effect may mean terminating the
importing arrangement and looking for another source of supply.
All too often, such suspension of imports has been the effect of the
withholding of appraisement 0 and this has given potentially great
leverage for effectively protectionist applications of the act on behalf
of U.S. manufacturers who do not in fact have a very strong case to
make.17
These factors have been even further exaggerated in the regulations
and actual proceedings under the act. While the regulations" attempt
to break down the stages of procedure in a somewhat more detailed
fashion than the statute, it remains perfectly clear from the regulations
and from the procedure under them that the investigation made by
the Commissioner of Customs on behalf of the Treasury 9 which leads
appraisement (which follows the preliminary less-than-foreign-market-value consid-
eration). 19 C.F.R. § 14.9(a) (1965).
" See Carbon Steel Bars & Shapes From Canada, 29 Fed. Reg. 12599 (1964).
Ehrenhaft, supra note 4, 60-61 and text at nn. 94-97; Report, supra note 1, at 10-11:
"Withholding of appraisements is the single most important threat which the
exporter and importer face in a dumping proceeding."
" For the period commencing with the first keeping of complete records up to
December 1965, the following breakdown may be schematized from Report, supra
note 1, at 19-20:
No. of Cases No Injury
Processed by Dismissed or Found By Dumping
Bureau of Closed Out Tariff Order
Customs By Bureau Comm'n Issued
Jan. 1, '34-Oct. 1, '54
(latter date marked
shift of jurisdiction 146 139 - 7
to determine injury to
the Tariff Comm'n)
Oct. 1, '54-Dec. '65 341 294 37 10
Apart from this quantitative analysis it seems quite clear that a qualitative,
economic analysis of the subjects of the proceedings initiated would show a strong
trend towards involvement of product groups of increasingly important industries.
Imports competing with the domestic paint, cement and steel industries, for example,
have been heavily involved in anti-dumping proceedings in recent years.
19 C.F.R. §§ 14. 6-14.13 (1965).
The authority to make the initial investigation has been delegated by the
Secretary to the Commissioner of Customs. See, e.g., Treasury Decision 53654
(1964). Cf. C. J. Tower & Sons v. United States, 71 F.2d 438 (Ct. Cust. & Pat.
App. 1934) (upholding an early delegation of similar authority to the Assistant
Secretary).
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to, (a) the determination that there are reasonable grounds to believe
or suspect that sales to the U.S. are being made at less than foreign
market value and, (b) to the all-important withholding of appraise-
ment notice, is based purely on the essentially arithmetical back-
calculation from the U.S. sales price to a price comparable with the
home-market sales price.20 Furthermore, it has been generally clear
in practice that this determination will be forthcoming at a relatively
preliminary stage of the investigation, very soon, so to speak, after
the needle has moved from the region of the dial marked "colorable
grounds" into the region of the dial marked "reasonable grounds,"
and that the possible opportunity for undoing the harm at a relatively
early stage by a wide ranging fair value inquiry has been completely
ignored. The rest of the consideration by the Secretary and his
delegate, leading up to a less than fair value determination by the
Secretary, is essentially more of the same 2-simply viewing more
background for the arithmetical back-calculation and comparison of
U.S. price and home-market price, without any opportunity for the
consideration of such important additional factors as whether the lower
U.S. price has been established to meet competition from U. S. man-
ufacturers or from those exporting to the U.S. market from other
countries. 2 This meeting-competition defense, which is one of the
most important and universally applied elements in making Robinson-
Patman act determinations,23 has clearly been held by the Tariff
Commission to be available to the foreign exporter and to be effective
in preventing an ultimate substantive finding that prohibited dumping
has occurred,24 but it is equally clear that the exporter and importer
See 19 C.F.R. § 14.6(b) (2), (e) (1965).
19 C.F.R. § 14.7 (1965).
Eschewing the pouring of this or other kinds of new wine into the different
terminological bottle represented by the statutory words "fair value," the 1957
Treasury Report, supra note 13, at 16-17, stated that:
With regard to decisions as to dumping price, the Treasury sees nojustification for regarding these as anything more than an exercise in arith-
metic. The comparison to be made is between the price the exporter sells in
the United States market and the price he sells, not for export, in his own
country. These prices must be adjusted so that they are properly comparable-
which typically means a comparison f.o.b. factory. If the price in the United
States market is lower, then as a simple matter of arithmetic there is a sale
at less than fair value. The word "fair" as used here simply means what one
ordinarily conceives of as the "fair market' value-what a willing buyer will
pay a willing seller. There is no connotation of "equitable" in this use of the
word. For this reason the effect on American industry is not an element to be
considered in connection with determinations as to fair value.
See also Ehrenhaft, supra note 4, at 63.
'See Standard Oil Co v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951); RowE, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 207-64.
'See, e.g., Rayon Staple Fiber from West Germany, 26 Fed. Reg. 6537 (1961)
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must wait for the Tariff Commission stage of the proceedings before
any presentation of this defensive material can be made, and that the
Secretary and his delegate will not consider materials relating to a
meeting-competition defense at the earlier stages of the proceedings
even if it would be clear that such materials would establish to the
overwhelming satisfaction of all concerned that no substantive viola-
tion under the anti-dumping act had occurred.2" And, of course, under
the statute it is not until the Tariff Commission stage that the injury
to the U.S. industry becomes a subject of inquiry,26 even though it
may be readily demonstrable that no injury has occurred or is likely
to occur.
Thus the most dangerous aspects of the withholding-of-appralse-
ment procedure are underlined and in a practical sense very much
encouraged by the tenor of the Treasury proceedings under the statute.
The importer may be confronted with a withholding of customs ap-
praisement at a very early stage after the bringing of a complaint by
an American manufacturer or by the Customs Service, and has to
look forward to a potential period of many months before a final
determination upon all the issues can be had, during all of which
time he faces the prospect that goods which he imports and sells will
be ultimately subjected to substantial additional duties which he will
have to absorb.
This seems to me to present very serious possibilities for abuse;
and indeed already to have led to some quite serious abuses. To
redress the balance and make the procedural aspects of the act conform
with its intended substantive alms, I think at least two kinds of reform
can be suggested. The narrower, and perhaps easier-although I am
not sure of this-might be cast in the form of adjusting the present
customs regulations to make it possible for the foreign exporter to
reassure his wavering importers and thus maintain the commercial
arrangements involved by guaranteeing that the exporter will bear
the cost of any special anti-dumping duty that ultimately is assessed.
(approving the meeting of competition from U. S. manufacturers); Hot-Rolled
Carbon Steel Wire Rods from Belgium, 28 Fed. Reg. 6474 (1963) ; from Luxembourg,
28 Fed. Reg. 6476 (1963); from West Germany, 28 Fed. Reg. 6606 (1963); from
France, 28 Fed. Reg. 7368 (1963) (all approving the meeting of foreign competition
-from Japan-on the U. S. market). Certain other defensive matters relating to
the substantive unfairness of the foreign competition, apart from the meeting-
competition defense, have also been permitted consideration at the Tariff Commis-
sion stage. See Titanium Dioxide from France, 28 Fed. Reg. 10467 (1963) ;
Nepheline Syenite from Canada, 26 Fed. Reg. 956 (1961) ; Report, supra note 1, at 17.
See notes 21, 22 supra.
- See text accompanying note 11 supra.
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The present regulation2r discourages any such guaranty except for a
narrow permit for a warranty of non-applicability of dumping duties
which may be granted to an importer where the merchandise has
been actually purchased or the agreement to purchase has been made
before the withholding of appraisement notice has been published and
where the merchandise is subsequently imported into the U.S. before
the Secretary of the Treasury makes his final determination that sales
are occurring at less than fair value and passes the case along to the
Tariff Commission. If the guaranty oversteps these bounds and there
is an ultimate adverse determination, this regulation has the effect
of decreasing the appraiser's ultimate figure, on any particular lot of
goods, for the U.S. purchase price, and of thereby increasing the dump-
ing duty which is due. To take an example, if back-calculation or
adjustment showed an f.o.b. factory price on certain goods of $12 per
unit to Canadian purchasers and $10 per unit to U.S. purchasers the
equalizing duty ordinarily assessed upon appraisement following an
adverse determination of the Tariff Commission would be $2 per unit
collected from the importer. But if the exporter had promised to
reimburse the importer this amount, the appraiser would deduct those
additional $2 per unit which the importer was to be reimbursed from
the purchase price calculated for U.S. sales, reducing it from $10 to
$8. Thereupon, the total equalizing dumping duty due would be $4
per unit. The additional $2 would either have to be paid by the
importer, or if he was reimbursed for that too, would become an
additional deduction from the original purchase price, et cetera.
If both the exporter and importer are convinced that they have a
good defense which they can clearly make out before the Tariff
Commission, such as a meeting-competition defense or a showing that
there has been and is likely to be no injury to the U.S. industry, then
presumably they can disregard the problem of withholding of appraise-
ment because no additional duty will in fact be anticipated, and their
arrangements will continue. If the importer is somewhat wary, how-
19 C.F.R. § 14.9(f) (1965):
In calculating purchase price or exporter's sales price, as the case may
be, there shall be deducted the amount of any special dumping duties which
are, or will be, paid by the manufacturer, producer, seller, or exporter, or
which are, or will be, refunded to the importer by the manufacturer, pro-
ducer, seller, or exporter, either directly or indirectly, but a warranty of
nonapplicability of dumping duties granted to an importer with respect to
merchandise which is (1) purchased, or agreed to be purchased, before
publication of a "Withholding of Appraisement Notice" with respect to
such merchandise and (2) exported before a determination of sales below
fair value is made, will not be regarded as affecting purchase price or
exporter's sales price.
[VOL. 41:315
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ever, even though the exporter is sure of his defense or is willing to
maintain the flow of products even at some risk during the with-
holding of appraisement period, the regulation presents him with an
impossible situation in which he cannot give a credible guaranty to
the worried importer beyond the very narrow exception described
above.
My first, and I think very modest, suggestion for reform is simply
that the exception in the regulation be broadened. Since the Treasury
consideration of the question between the withholding-of-appraisement
notice and the final less-than-fair-value determination is essentially,
as we have seen, "just more arithmetic," there seems no good reason
why the exporter should not be allowed to extend his warranty of non-
applicability of dumping duties from the date of that final Treasury
determination to the date-which under the statute may be up to
three months later-of the final determination of the Tariff Commis-
sion, a determination which will for the first time take into account
such critical additional factors as the meeting-competition defense
and injury to the U.S. industry.2" Moreover, there seems to be no
good reason for insisting that the warranty can apply only to goods
purchased or agreed to be purchased before the withholding of ap-
praisement notice was published. This seems to smack more of the
economic isolationism of the twenties than the world trade realities
of mid-twentieth century. If the concern is that gigantic orders may
be placed by the importer after the withholding of appraisement
notice but before the Tariff Commission decision, this can easily be
remedied by limiting the effectiveness of the warranty to quantities
which are not substantially in excess of those purchased during a
base period preceding the issuance of the withholding of appraisement
notice. Thus, my first proposal might take the form of suggesting
that section 14.9(f) of the Customs Regulations 9 be changed to permit
the exporter to warrant to the importer the non-applicability of dump-
ing duties with respect to all goods purchased or exported between
the date of the withholding of appraisement notice and the date of
the final decision of the Tariff Commission, so long as the quantities
involved are not substantially in excess of the quantities purchased
or exported during comparable preceding periods of time. In this
way, the exporter who believes he has a clear defense or who wishes
to maintain the flow of goods despite the risk of an adverse finding
See text accompanying notes 23-26 supra.
' Supra note 27.
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can effectively allay his importer's fears as to the adverse effects of
the withholding-of-appraisement notice.
My second suggestion relates to a possible reform of language of
the statute itself, for the exporter as well as the importer may be
intimidated by a withholding of appraisement, and unwilling to back
up his importer with a warranty against dumping duties despite the
existence of a strong defensive case. Basically, it seems to me that
if appraisement is to be withheld on the basis of an essentially simple
and arithmetical view of the facts there should be two sides to this
arithmetical view. Withholding of appraisement with its potentially
disastrous consequences for the flow of exports which may be quite
innocent of the chaxge levelled should not occur until the Secretary
has had an opportunity to form a reasonable belief, not only as to
the comparative foreign market and U.S. price, but also as to the most
immediately salient factors which bear on the possible merit of a
meeting-competition defense or on the possible complete absence of
injury or threat of injury to the U.S. industry concerned. Thus, I
would like to suggest that some serious thought be given to a reform
which might be cast as an amendment to the anti-dumping act which
in effect would state, first, that the Secretary's determination that
there is reason to believe that U.S. sales are occurring at less than
foreign market value shall not be accompanied with a withholding
of appraisement notice if the Secretary is also given reasonable grounds
for believing that a substantial majority of the sales believed to be
at less than foreign market value have been made at the price charged
in good faith in order to meet the equally low price of a competitor
selling in, or exporting from some other country into,30 the U.S.
market.
Secondly, in order for the withholding of appraisement notice to
issue, the Secretary should also be required to find reasonable grounds
" The meeting of foreign competition may indeed be economically more relevant
than the meeting of domestic competition, since a complex of economic factors
makes it likely for many products that all foreign competitors will have to establish
a price below that of any substantial domestic producer in order to obtain U. S.
orders. The dissenting Commissioners in Carbon Steel Bars & Shapes From Canada,
supra note 16, cite such relevant factors as long lead time, uncertainties over
future supplies (paradoxically, it may be noted, as dumping proceedings disruptive
of the flow of imports become more common, the U. S. customer may demand
further price concessions to offset this new uncertainty factor as a condition of
doing business with the foreign manufacturer), difficulties in making adjustments
for damaged or defective merchandise (or, it might be added, more generally in
getting effective legal redress if needed), and lack of close contact between customer
and supplier. 29 Fed. Reg. at 12599. See the cases cited in note 24 supra, involving
the meeting of foreign competition. The lawfulness of the foreign competitor's
price--i.e., whether he too was perhaps violating the anti-dumping act, or possibly
[VOL. 41:315
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for believing that certain salient facts indicative of effects upon the
U.S. industry could be demonstrated. This would, for one thing, give
the U.S. industry an early chance to show that it was sufficiently
concerned about what was happening to present the requested data
to the Secretary. Procedural steps could, of course, be outlined for
assuring that the data for one industry member was not made public
or shown to other industry members." The data required might, I
should think, be data showing that either all U.S. producers of the
product or at least two out of the leading three producers of the product
could reasonably be thought to have suffered declines on the order of
ten per cent with respect to at least one of the following four factors
of their business during the time period for which the Secretary found
reason to believe that exporter's sales at less than foreign market
value were occurring: (1) a decline in the total value of their sales
of the product in a relevant geographic market area comprising at
least ten per cent of the population of the U.S., or (2) in their total
number of units of sales in such a market, or (3) in their percentage
share of the sales of such product made by all producers-domestic
and foreign-in that market, or (4) in their total profits after tax
attributable to all of their U.S. sales of that product; and that there
was reason to believe that the decline thus found was or might be
in substantial part the result of sales made by the foreign exporter
at less than foreign market value. In essence, the United States
industry or the leading U.S. producers would have to make out at
least a prima facie arithmetical case of injury before withholding of
appraisement could occur.
Nor, I might say in conclusion, do I think that the climate within
the U.S. government is such that a good chance for proposing and
getting such reforms does not exist. Despite the clamor of certain
domestic industries and the publicity given the debate on the Herlong-
Hartke bill, I think there are indications of strong undercurrents of
attitude among those responsible for policy-making which would lead
to a recognition of current international trade practices acknowledging
different prices in different national markets, perhaps embodying this
Robinson-Patman-probably should not be a subject of inquiry at this pre-with-
holding-of-appraisement stage, although it probably should become relevant at the
final Tariff Commission stage of the proceedings. The legality of the price met is,
of course, relevant to ultimate substantive determinations under Robinson-Patman.
See generally RowE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 220-29.
" The general regulatory provision as to obtaining of confidential treatment for
information submitted in antidumping proceedings, 19 C.F.R. § 14.6(a) (1965), may
well be sufficient.
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recognition in a multilateral treaty which, most consonant with the
broad policies of GATT3" and our national policies33 favorable to
freer trade, ensures against protectionist use of anti-dumping legis-
lation. 4
It may well be, in fact, that the most viable political framework
for effecting the two reforms suggested above-as well as other needed
reforms"3 in the anti-dumping act-is not to try directly for amend-
ment of the regulations and the statute, but instead, to make these
liberalizing reforms part of our country's quid pro quo in a multilateral
treaty to supplement the very general language of Article VI of
GATT36 by ensuring that the various national anti-dumping laws do
not grow into a strong under-current of protectionism working against
the post-war tide of free trade. For trade policy abuses can, alas, be
imitated by others and America today needs her exports37 far more
than she needs a new system, or effectively becoming such, of protec-
tion from competing imports, which is made indiscriminately available
to private parties.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 61 Stat A3 (1947).
See, e.g., the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, §§ 101-405, 76 Stat. 872, 19 U.S.C.§§ 1801-991 (1965), which permits the President to enter into agreements cutting
deeply into existing tariff levels.
" A not-yet-published memorandum of remarks said to have been submitted
recently by the U. S. at the GATT meeting in Geneva supposedly points in this
direction. Resolutions were introduced at the last sessions of the Senate and
House proposing an international agreement to harmonize anti-dumping administra-
tion. S. Res. 133, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) ; H.R. Res. 405, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965). See the remarks of Representative Curtis, 112 CONG. REc. 5112-16 (daily ed.
March 8, 1966).
35 See Ehrenhaft, supra note 4.
"' General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 32, art. VI.
'Note that the central Robinson-Patman provision, § 2(a), scrupulously avoids
any impact on U.S. exports, and places no restrictions on "dumping" abroad by
U. S. manufacturers. It applies only to commodities sold for use, consumption or
resale within the United States, its territories or possessions. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936),
15 U.S.C. § 13 (a) (1964). See RowE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 81-83.
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